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1 Introduction
An agent must apprehend her world before she can make decisions. Her perception generates
a representation of the environment—“[a] ‘small-scale model’ of external reality” used to
formulate and evaluate her options (Craik, 1943: 61).
Since Savage (1954), economics has recognized that distilling the “grand world” into a
“small world” precedes rational decision-making. It is frequently assumed that the small
world is a parsimonious but accurate model, exogenously given. Alternatively, the small
world can result from a deliberate choice made by an agent (e.g., by allocating attention
among different variables) or by a third party (e.g., by designing how much information is
provided). However, Savage warned that the deliberate choice of an appropriate small world
is a difficult task—“a matter of judgment and experience about which it is impossible to
enunciate complete and sharply defined general principles” (1954: 16).
Cognitive science goes further than economics on this question: it is widely agreed that
agents distill the environment into partial representations and that agents’ mental models
depend on cognitive mechanisms that usually escape conscious control. For example, Allport
(1954: 20) stated that “the human mind must think with the aid of categories. Once formed,
categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process.” In
short, in the cognitive approach, the small world cannot be attributed to a deliberate choice
and need not be accurate.
In this paper, we develop and analyze a model of how agents’ partial representations affect
their strategic behavior and hence their performance. Motivated by the cognitive approach,
our main goal is to explore the role of “small-scale” mental models in strategic interactions.
Our model can also be interpreted in terms of information design and thus nests a version of
the economic approach as well.
We study two agents who engage in strategic interaction using a shared mental model.
The environment is an uncountable space G of games. Each agent distills G into a finite
number of categories called situations. The collection of situations is a partition of G, which
we call the agent’s frame.1 The frame-based cognition of G is coarse, because the frame
reduces an uncountable set to a finite partition.
Under our economic approach, the frame is exogenously given or follows from known
choices: when a game from G is realized, an agent learns only which situation has occurred
and updates her belief accordingly. We call this case generative because the agent’s frame is
1 We borrow this term from Bacharach (2003: 63), who defines it as “the set of concepts an agent uses in
thinking about the world” and assumes that a frame induces a partition. Less formally, Goffman (1974: 21)
uses this term to connote “schemata of interpretation” that allow agents to “locate, perceive, identify, and
label” events in the world around them.
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generated by an information structure known to the agent. The generative case is consistent
with the “metaphorical” interpretation of information design (Bergemann and Morris, 2017:
4).
Under our cognitive approach, in contrast, agents have no access to the cognitive process
that produces their mental representation: they are unaware that they are framing, and they
cannot imagine that others perceive the world differently. More precisely, they know only (i)
the set of situations that could be realized and (ii) which one has been; they are not aware
of the underlying games in G. We call this case interpretive because the frame summarizes
how agents interpret their environment.2
We assume that both parties share the same frame. In the generative case, this occurs
when the information structure is symmetric; in the interpretive case, the shared frame may
be culturally determined, as we discuss below. We study how the frame affects strategic
behavior, under minimal requirements of rationality: conditional on what their frame lets
them perceive, agents have correct beliefs and play their dominant strategy. Our analysis
thus applies to both our generative and interpretive cases.
We provide three main results. First, in a one-shot interaction, the coarse representation
induced by a frame can either decrease or increase the parties’ payoffs, compared to having
full information about the environment. We say that the shared frame may induce either
a fog of conflict or a fog of cooperation. In the generative case, this implies that limiting
access to information can make both agents better (or worse) off. In the interpretive case,
it suggests that performance differences may be due to differences in cognitive frames across
dyads.
Second, we consider a repeated interaction. In each period an independent draw from G
selects (a) the game the parties actually face and (b) conditional on their shared frame, which
situation they perceive. Assuming an infinite horizon and subgame perfection, standard ar-
guments allow the parties to increase their payoffs above the static level if they are sufficiently
patient. We focus on the opposite comparative static: fix the parties’ discount rate δ and
analyze how their frame affects payoffs in a repeated interaction. We find that, for fixed δ,
there are frames under which the parties’ highest equilibrium payoffs are greater (or lower)
than in a repeated interaction under full information. In this respect, the configuration of
the situations induced by a frame, called the frame’s footprint, is as important as discounting
in facilitating cooperation.
Third, moving beyond comparative statics, we investigate the dynamics of changes in
2 Our terminology is similar to Hong and Page (2009: 2175), who suggest that “generated signals [. . .] are
passively received by the agents, [whereas to] create an interpreted signal, an agent filters reality into a set of
categories.”
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the shared frame within a dyad. We distinguish between incremental change, when only the
footprint of the situations perceived by the parties varies, but not the dominant action in a
given situation, versus radical change, where both the footprint and the action vary. When
the cost of reshaping the footprint is increasing in the size of the change, the optimal change
in frame may be incremental and lead to lower gross payoffs than a radical (but expensive)
change would. When changes in the frame are costless but of uncertain effectiveness, we
illustrate how behavioral inertia after a radical change may have perverse effects on short-
term performance.
Framing this paper
We take two inspirations from economics and one from cognitive science. First, at the in-
dividual level, we follow Simon (1986), Kreps (1990a), and Rubinstein (1991) by separating
cognition from behavior. Simon (1986: S211) cautions that “we must distinguish between
the real world and the actor’s perception of it and reasoning about it.” Kreps (1990a: 155)
explicitly separates cognition and (rational) behavior: “the individual builds a model of his
choice problem, [. . .] which is typically a simplification or a misspecification (or both) of the
‘true situation’. The individual finds his ‘optimal’ choice of action within the framework of
this model and acts accordingly.” Finally, Rubinstein (1991) calls for game-theoretic models
to account for what agents perceive.
Second, at the group level, we follow Denzau and North (1994), Aoki (2001), and Ostrom
(2005) by emphasizing the shared mental models that can be held by individuals with common
backgrounds or experiences. Denzau and North (1994: 5) argue that the experiences of past
generations are distilled into “a culturally provided set of categories and priors.” Aoki (2001:
235) discusses how shifts in equilibria are associated with changes in the parties’ “common
cognitive representations,” and Ostrom (2005: 106) emphasizes that “cultural beliefs systems
affects the mental models that individuals utilize.” More recently, Hoff and Stiglitz call
for economic analyses to consider “socially constructed cognitive frames” (2010: 141) and
“cultural mental models [such as] concepts, categories, social identities, [and] narratives”
(2016: 26).
Finally, from cognitive science, we follow a wide consensus that subjective representations
mediate between perception and choice: “we have mental structures, especially schematic
representations of complex social phenomena, which shape the way we attend to, interpret,
remember, and respond emotionally to the information we encounter and possess”’ (DiMag-
gio, 1997: 273). We focus on categories as a basic form of such cognitive simplifications:
“categorization is the mental operation by which the brain classifies objects and events [and]
this operation is the basis for the construction of our knowledge of the world” (Cohen and
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Lefebvre, 2005: 2).
Related literature
Categorization is not new to the economics literature. For example, Mullainathan et al. (2008)
and Fryer and Jackson (2009) use categorization to model coarse cognition; Wernerfelt (2004),
Crémer et al. (2007), and Blume and Board (2014) use it to model coarse language. Another
strand of research studies categorization of the elements of a given game; e.g., in Jehiel (2005)
each player partitions the opponents’ moves into similarity classes. We focus our review on
contributions where the categorization concerns different games, because this case is closest
to ours.
Heller and Winter (2016) assume that each agent initially and simultaneously decides a
categorization over a finite set G of two-player games, committing to play the same strategy
for all the games in the same category. Categorizations may be part of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium and the strategic value of choosing a coarser partition can be positive, akin to
our fog of cooperation.
Categorizations might emerge from an evolutionary process. Mengel (2012a) studies the
evolutionary fitness of different cultures (viewed as different partitions of the game space)
under the assumption of persistent noise in the transmission process across generations. Our
model shows that categorizations can be advantageous even when errors play no role.
Samuelson (2001) studies finite automata that bundle bargaining games to save cognitive
resources for more demanding games. Mengel (2012b) considers two players with arbitrary
small reasoning costs who, under reinforcement learning, end up bundling games into cate-
gories that are then played identically. Bednar and Page (2007) use agent-based simulations
to demonstrate that different rules of behavior emerge when different pairs of games are
bundled in the same category.
Moving from theory to experiments, psychology has produced a vast literature on cate-
gorization in individual decision-making (Cohen and Lefebvre, 2005), but categorization has
attracted far less attention within games. Halevy et al. (2012) show that individuals map
the outcome interdependence from a variety of conflicts to only four archetypal situations.
Grimm and Mengel (2012) provide evidence of learning spillovers across six games and match
it to a model of coarse partitions of the space of games where agents best reply to the “av-
erage game” in each category; see Bednar et al. (2012) and Huck et al. (2011) for related
experimental results. Transfer effects across games played in sequence have been attributed
to perceiving their similarity; see Knez and Camerer (2000).
4
2 The model
We study an environment involving symmetric interactions where rational agents will either
cooperate (as in common-interest games) or compete (as in zero-sum games). When these
clear-cut interactions are conflated, interesting tensions can emerge.
For example, the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) can be associated to a lottery between a
common-interest (CI) game and a zero-sum (ZS) game; see Kalai and Kalai (2013). Consider
the interaction between two parties facing a 50–50 lottery over the CI and ZS games below.
H L
H 10, 10 6, 6
L 6, 6 2, 2
CI
H L
H 0, 0 −6, 6
L 6,−6 0, 0
ZS
This interaction is best-reply equivalent (Morris and Ui, 2004) to the PD game
H L
H 5, 5 0, 6
L 6, 0 1, 1
PD
based on the expected payoffs from the lottery. The cooperation motive in the CI game
encourages agents to play (H,H), while the competitive motive in the ZS game suggests
they play (L,L). Given the payoffs in the CI and ZS games above, when the lottery puts
probability p = 1/2 on the CI game, the cooperative motive is weaker than the competitive
one. The cooperative motive would instead prevail for p > 3/5.
We generalize this example by considering CI games with payoff parameter a > 0 and
ZS games with payoff parameter z > 0. In the game G(a, z; p) shown in Figure 1, the two
parties face a CI game with probability p and a ZS game with probability 1− p.
H L
H a, a 0, 0
L 0, 0 −a,−a
CI
H L
H 0, 0 −z, z
L z,−z 0, 0
ZS
Figure 1: Nature draws CI or ZS, with probabilities p and 1− p.
Assuming that the parties move before uncertainty is resolved, the game G(a, z; p) with
imperfect information is best-reply equivalent to the game below.
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H L
H pa, pa −(1− p)z, (1− p)z
L (1− p)z,−(1− p)z −pa,−pa
Defining
pi = a
a+ z ,
the dominant strategy for each party is to play H when pi > 1 − p and L when pi < 1 − p.
From a strategic viewpoint, it is therefore possible to reduce the number of dimensions from
three to two: there is a projection from the (a, z; p)-space to the (pi, p)-space that preserves
best replies, while losing information about payoffs. Under this projection, (pi, p) is the
(representative) element for a class of games that are best reply-equivalent. Therefore, with
some abuse of language, we refer to (pi, p) as a game.
We assume that p is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]; moreover, a and z have independent
exponential distributions with parameter λ = 1, so pi = a/(a+ z) has a uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. The bidimensional space of games G = [0, 1]2 is thus uniformly distributed and
is depicted in Figure 2. Any game with pi > 1 − p is a CI game where H is the dominant
pi
p
0
ZS
CI
H
L
Figure 2: The space G of games.
strategy, and any game with pi < 1− p is a PD game where L is the dominant strategy.3
As a benchmark, in this paragraph we consider the case where each party perceives any
game drawn from the space G as distinct and plays the appropriate dominant strategy in
whatever game is drawn. The expected payoff is 1/3; see Proposition A.1 in the Appendix,
where we have collected theorems and proofs.
We henceforth assume that each dimension of the space G—the payoff ratio pi in [0, 1]
and the probability p in [0, 1]—is too rich to allow either party to perceive all its elements
as distinct. Instead, each agent apprehends each dimension by means of a categorization
that bundles uncountable points into a finite number of intervals. For simplicity, we work
with binary categorizations, respectively defined by the thresholds pˆi and pˆ. Thus, an agent
3 One may reformulate the space of games as a single game with payoff uncertainty.
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categorizes pi as High (h) if pi > pˆi and Low (`) if pi < pˆi; similarly, p is High (h) if p > pˆ and
Low (`) if p < pˆ.4
An agent with binary categorizations for pi and p perceives four cells, as depicted in
Figure 3. We call each of the four cells a situation. A cell bundles together many games, all
pi
p
0
ZS
CIS4 S1
S3 S2
pˆi
pˆ
Figure 3: A categorization of G into four situations.
of which are perceived by a party as instances of the same situation. That is, when an agent
faces a game from G and wonders “what kind of situation am I in?”, only four answers come
to her mind. For example, the northeastern cell S1 corresponds to the situation where both
pi and p are perceived as h. If she views the dimension pi as the (relative) salience of the
cooperation payoff and the dimension p as the (likelihood of the) opportunity for cooperation,
the situation S1 involves high salience and high opportunity. The other three situations have
similar interpretations.
The frame of an agent is the collection of the situations that she perceives, identified by
the threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ). In the generative case, the frame is a direct consequence of the
information structure, which is known by the agents. In the interpretive case, she simply
perceives a game (pi, p) as a situation, described by each of the dimensions pi and p taking
value h or `: only the model-builder, not the agent, knows that the agent (a) categorizes
games and (b) does so via the threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ).
Throughout this paper, we assume that interacting parties share the same frame (pˆi, pˆ): in
each of the four situations associated with the frame, they perceive a single 2× 2 symmetric
game with payoffs equal to the expected payoffs from all the games ascribed to that situation.5
In sum, agents’ strategic understanding of the space of games G is coarsened into the four
situations S1, S2, S3, S4 in Figure 3. Using Lemmata A.2 and A.3, the expected payoffs to
the first party (rescaled by a factor of 2) are shown in Figure 4 for each of the four situations
perceived under the frame (pˆi, pˆ).
4 Which categorization applies at pi = pˆi or at p = pˆ is immaterial, because this event has zero probability.
5 Conditional on the frame, the agents have correct beliefs about the distribution of payoffs in each situation.
In the generative case, this occurs because they can compute this distribution. In the interpretive case, we
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H L
H pˆi2(1− pˆ2) −pˆi(2− pˆi)(1− pˆ)2
L pˆi(2− pˆi)(1− pˆ)2 −pˆi2(1− pˆ2)
S4
H L
H (1− pˆi2)(1− pˆ2) −(1− pˆi)2(1− pˆ)2
L (1− pˆi)2(1− pˆ)2 −(1− pˆi2)(1− pˆ2)
S1
H L
H pˆi2pˆ2 −pˆi(2− pˆi)pˆ(2− pˆ)
L pˆi(2− pˆi)pˆ(2− pˆ) −pˆi2pˆ2
S3
H L
H (1− pˆi2)pˆ2 −(1− pˆi)2pˆ(2− pˆ)
L (1− pˆi)2pˆ(2− pˆ) −(1− pˆi2)pˆ2
S2
Figure 4: Perceived payoffs in the four situations under the frame (pˆi, pˆ).
After playing a perceived situation, the parties receive the payoffs associated with the
actual game drawn: either CI with probability p or ZS with probability 1− p from Figure 1.
In the interpretive case, they ascribe the difference between the expected payoff and the
realized payoff to noise.
We intend the interpretive case of this model as one way to capture differences—sometimes
attributed to “culture”— in how agents perceive not only what situation they are in but also
what the likely consequences of alternative actions are. By assuming that two agents share
a frame, we imagine them coming from the same culture.
3 One-shot interaction
This section considers the one-shot interaction between two parties under a shared frame
(pˆi, pˆ), with pˆi+ pˆ 6= 1. We label the northeast and southwest situations S1 and S3 congruous,
because their descriptors pi and p are both high or both low: the salience of cooperation pi
and the opportunity for cooperation p are aligned. In contrast, we say that the two situations
S2 and S4 are incongruous because their descriptors are misaligned: one is high and the other
is low.
Rational behavior in the two congruous situations is unequivocal. Figure 4 shows that the
situation S1 is always perceived as a CI game under any frame (pˆi, pˆ), so H is the dominant
strategy. Similarly, the situation S3 is always perceived as a PD game, so L is the dominant
strategy. In short, regardless of the frame, rational behavior for a party facing a congruous
situation is to play H in S1 and L in S3.
Assuming that the frame satisfies pˆi + pˆ 6= 1, we find that there is also a unique dom-
inant strategy for the incongruous situations S2 and S4. This is characterized in the next
proposition, which is an immediate corollary of Proposition A.6 in the Appendix.
assume that the cognitive process selecting their frame also provides them with correct beliefs about payoffs.
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Proposition 1. The unique dominant strategy for both S2 and S4 is H if pˆi + pˆ > 1, and it
is L if pˆi + pˆ < 1.
Unlike the congruous situations, the dominant strategy for the incongruous situations depends
on the frame.
Combining the dominant strategies over the four situations, we find two rational rules of
behavior, shown in Figure 5. The first rule, depicted on the left, is optimal if pˆi+ pˆ > 1: play
H in any situation except S3, and then play L; we call it the OR rule, because it prescribes
playing H when either pi or p is perceived as high. The second rule, shown on the right,
is optimal if pˆi + pˆ < 1: play H only in S1 and otherwise play L; we call it the AND rule,
because it prescribes playing H only when both pi and p are perceived as high.
pi
p
0
ZS
CI
H H
L H
pˆi
pˆ
pi
p
0
ZS
CI
L H
L L
Figure 5: The OR and AND rules of behavior.
Since the frame is shared and payoffs are symmetric, the parties will play the same
strategy in a given situation. If pˆi + pˆ > 1, they will play (H,H) in all situations except S3
and (L,L) in S3 (OR rule); if pˆi+ pˆ < 1, they will play (H,H) only in S1 and (L,L) otherwise
(AND rule). Therefore, different frames can induce different strategy profiles when parties
encounter incongruous situations.
Having computed optimal strategies, we next analyze how the parties’ expected payoffs
depend on the thresholds (pˆi, pˆ) of their shared frame. First, payoffs change continuously in
(pˆi, pˆ) unless the thresholds induce a switch in the parties’ rule of behavior; second, if the rule
of behavior switches, then there is a discontinuous change in payoffs.
Proposition A.7 gives the expected payoff to each party as a function of pˆi and pˆ. As an
illustrative example, suppose pˆi = pˆ = x so that a change in x makes the thresholds shift in
lockstep. The parties play the OR rule for x > 1/2 and the AND rule for x < 1/2. Figure 6
shows the payoff to each party as a function of the common value x for the two thresholds.
Within either the OR or the AND region, payoffs are continuously decreasing in x. On the
other hand, moving x leftward across 1/2 implies an abrupt drop in payoffs, as the parties
switch to the less cooperative AND rule of behavior. Nonetheless, depending on x, the AND
9
xU
0 1/2 1
1/3 benchmark
max payoff
O
R
−OR
+
A
N
D
−
A
N
D
+
Figure 6: Payoffs as a function of x when pˆi = pˆ = x.
rule may outperform the OR rule.
Framing games as situations can either help or hurt the parties’ payoffs, relative to the
benchmark case where each game is perceived as distinct. This is apparent in Figure 6, where
the benchmark payoff of 1/3 cuts across the payoff curve. Intuitively, one may think of the
frame as creating a fog that confounds different games into a single situation, forcing a party
to deal with all such games in one way. Depending on the frame, the result is either a fog
of conflict (marked −), making agents play less cooperatively than they would under full
information, or a fog of cooperation (marked +), making them play more cooperatively. Note
that either fog can occur under either rule of behavior, so frames evidently do more than
determine rules of behavior.
We can identify which frames generate which kind of fog. Proposition A.8 states formally
a simple characterization, but the main message is conveyed through a picture. Each frame
is associated with a threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ) in [0, 1]2 so the unit square in Figure 7 stands for
the space of the frames. We emphasize that Figure 7 does not portray the space G of the
games (pi, p), but rather the set of threshold pairs (pˆi, pˆ) that define a frame.6
The OR rule prevails when the parties’ shared frame is a threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ) above the
diagonal, while the AND rule prevails when it is a pair below. The curve above the diagonal
separates the OR region into the shared frames (pˆi, pˆ) generating a fog of conflict (marked
−) versus those generating a fog of cooperation (marked +). Similarly, the curve below the
diagonal separates the AND region into fog of conflict (marked −) versus fog of cooperation
(marked +). Consistent with the special case depicted in Figure 6, moving from northeast
to southwest within a rule in Figure 7 improves payoffs continuously; on the other hand,
crossing the boundary coming from the OR into the AND rule causes a discontinuous drop
6 One of us enjoys the mnemonic “put your hat on” when keeping track of p versus pˆ.
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pˆipˆ
0
OR−
OR+
AND−
AND+
Figure 7: Fog of cooperation (+) and fog of conflict (−).
in payoffs. Switches in the rule of behavior motivate part of our discussion about changing
frames in Section 5.
As one way to summarize the interpretive case of this static model, we find it useful to
imagine two parties who share a low-performing frame arranging a site visit to observe two
other parties who share a high-performing frame. All parties perceive situations in terms
of their own categorizations; the low-performing parties observe the actions chosen by the
high-performing parties.
As a dramatic example, consider the discontinuity at x = 1/2 in Figure 6, and suppose
that the low- and high-performing frames have x = .45 and x = .55, respectively. For all
the games (pi, p) from the set (.45, .55) × (.45, .55), the low-performing parties perceive the
situation S1 and hence a CI game, expecting the high-performing parties to choose (H,H),
while the high-performing parties perceive the situation S3 and hence a PD game, leading
them to choose (L,L). Thus, on this set of games, the high-performing team does worse.
The more important difference cuts the other way: in the incongruous situations the high-
performing parties perceive a CI game and so choose (H,H), whereas the low-performing
parties perceive a PD (even for games when both teams agree that an incongruous cell has
been realized) and so choose (L,L). In sum, the low-performing parties will be mystified by
the site visit: when they see CI, they observe their hosts playing (L,L) with small probability;
and when they see PD, they observe their hosts playing (H,H) with larger probability.
We see the interpretive case of this stylized model as a small step towards understand-
ing widespread evidence of differences in cooperation during evolution (Boyd and Richerson,
2009) and among cultures (Henrich et al., 2005), communities (Ostrom, 1990), firms (Leiben-
stein, 1982), and teams (Cole, 1991). Moving from the field to the laboratory, experiments
show that cultural frames differ in how they perceive situations as “cooperative” or “competi-
tive” (Keller and Lowenstein, 2011) and how different frames affect cooperation levels (Pruitt,
1970; Liberman et al., 2004). Many explanations of such differences in cooperation emphasize
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differences in preferences; we provide a complementary explanation based on differences in
shared cognition which, in turn, might arise from cultural differences.
4 Repeated interaction
Having constructed a model where shared frames shape behavior in static situations, we
next consider the case of infinitely repeated interactions. Under any frame, the congruous
situation S3 is perceived as a PD. Furthermore, if pˆi+ pˆ < 1, then the incongruous situations
S2 and S4 are also perceived as PDs. In a repeated interaction, familiar logic might allow
the parties to cooperate in some or all of these PDs, even if they would defect in a one-shot
interaction.
We analyze such opportunities for long-term cooperation using a multi-period model,
where in each period the stage game is randomly drawn from the space G of games and
perceived as one of four situations under the shared frame (pˆi, pˆ). As in the static model,
given their frame, the parties have correct beliefs: before a game is drawn in a given period,
the parties expect to face situation S1 with probability (1 − pˆi)(1 − pˆ), situation S2 with
probability (1 − pˆi)pˆ, situation S3 with probability pˆipˆ, and situation S4 with probability
pˆi(1 − pˆ). We assume that the parties have the same discount factor δ < 1, and we rescale
their discounted payoffs by a factor (1−δ) to make them comparable to the one-shot payoffs.
We analyze subgame-perfect equilibria in trigger strategies where defection (i.e., playing
L) in a PD situation is met by defection in all future PD situations, discarding the possibility
that punishment calls for a party to play (the dominated) action L in a CI situation. We are
especially interested in the case of full cooperation, when agents play (H,H) everywhere.
As above, we briefly consider the benchmark case where the parties can distinguish all the
games in G. Then the parties can support full cooperation if δ ≥ 24/25; see Proposition A.9.
Returning to the case of a shared frame, recall that the one-shot model calls for the OR
rule of behavior if pˆi+ pˆ > 1, but the AND rule if pˆi+ pˆ < 1. As above, we reduce the number
of parameters by assuming pˆi = pˆ = x; then the two rules obtain for x > 1/2 and x < 1/2.
Consider x > 1/2: the only situation perceived as a PD is S3. The frame’s footprint, here
given by x, has three effects. First, when x increases, there is a probability x2 that the PD
situation occurs in the future. Second, when the PD situation does occur, the temptation
of a short-term payoff improvement from defecting (L) rather than cooperating (H) initially
goes up (until x = 2/3) and then shrinks to zero. Finally, in the trigger-strategy equilibrium,
the threat of a long-term payoff loss from reversion to the static equilibrium after defecting is
decreasing in x. These effects of shared cognition on the perceived frequency of PD situations
and on the perceived relative strength of temptation versus punishment all influence the
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viability of long-term cooperation.
In spite of these three effects of the frame’s footprint, the familiar intuition that a suffi-
ciently high δ supports cooperation (i.e, both parties playing H) in the S3 situation survives:
if
δ ≥ 2− 2x2− 2x+ x4
then there is a trigger-strategy equilibrium where the parties play H in the S3 situation; see
Proposition A.11. This critical region for x > 1/2 is illustrated in Figure 8: given δ and x,
either the parties can sustain cooperation in ALL situations, or they cooperate only in those
situations perceived to be CI (which, given x > 1/2, is the OR rule from the static game).
In particular, for δ ≥ 16/17, sustaining ALL is possible for any value x > 1/2.
x
δ
0 1/2
16/23
16/17
1
ALL
ALL
AND
(static) OR
(static)
Figure 8: Optimal cooperation in the repeated interaction.
Consider now x < 1/2. Proposition A.12 demonstrates a similar result, shown in Figure 8
for x < 1/2: given δ and x, either the parties can sustain cooperation in ALL situations, or
they cooperate only in the situation perceived to be CI (which, given x < 1/2, is the AND
rule from the static game).
Our analysis reiterates the familiar theme that repetition and patience may allow the
parties to achieve higher payoffs than in the static model. The novel point here is that
performance differences may arise from differences in shared frames, even when all parties
share the same discount factor and are playing the best repeated–interaction equilibrium they
can, given how they perceive the space of games.
This novel point is illustrated most vividly if we assume a discount factor 16/23 < δ <
16/17. Then Figure 8 shows that, as x progresses from 0 to 1, the best outcome that parties
can sustain in a repeated interaction changes from AND to ALL to OR to ALL again. For
instance, taking δ = .8, Figure 9 shows that either expected payoffs are at their maximum
(normalized) value of 1/2 (such as for x1 < x < 1/2 or for x2 < x < 1) or they are at their
static level (such as for 0 < x < x1 or for 1/2 < x < x2), where the critical values x1 ≈ 0.255
and x2 ≈ 0.648 depend on the chosen value δ = .8.
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1/2 max payoff
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Figure 9: Payoffs in the repeated interaction for δ = .8.
In the generative case, this analysis of repeated interaction shows that, for a given δ, there
may be quite different information structures that are equally conducive to full cooperation:
x1 < x < 1/2 or x2 < x < 1. Furthermore, the full information benchmark says that full
cooperation is feasible only if δ ≥ 24/25. But, taking for instance δ = .8 in Figure 8, it is
possible to have full cooperation using coarser frames, regardless of which rational rule of
behavior (AND/ OR) these frames support in one-shot interactions. This latter result shows
that adding fog in agents’ information structures can help them sustain full cooperation.7
For the interpretive case, we again imagine low-performing parties conducting a site visit
to observe high-performing parties. Importantly, all parties share a common discount factor,
such as δ = .8 in Figure 9. Parties able to achieve only the static equilibrium (whether under
the AND rule for 0 < x < x1 or under the OR rule for 1/2 < x < x2) understand that the
interaction is repeated but calculate that δ is not high enough to allow the ALL equilibrium,
whereas parties with different shared frames (x1 < x < 1/2 or x2 < x < 1) share the same δ
but calculate that a trigger-strategy equilibrium will support cooperation in ALL situations.
The low-performing parties will again be mystified by the site visit, observing cooperation
on (H,H) in many situations that all four parties perceive as PDs, and perhaps hearing
explanations from the high-performing parties such as “Sure, we see a PD, but the shadow
of the future makes cooperation credible today.”
We saw the interpretive case of the static model as a small step towards understanding
a broad set of findings concerning evolution, cultures, communities, firms, teams, and more.
In contrast, we see the interpretive case of this repeated model as a larger step towards a
smaller set of findings.
A growing literature documents persistent performance differences among seemingly sim-
ilar plants and firms; e.g., Syverson (2011). Bloom et al. (2016) find that measures of man-
7 This point may be reinforced. As noted above, our benchmark with agents distinguishing games up to
(pi, p) allows full cooperation for δ ≥ 24/25. If we let them have a finer partition and distinguish games up to
(a, z, p), then Proposition A.10 shows that full cooperation is impossible for any δ.
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agement practices correlate with these performance differences, and Gibbons and Hender-
son (2012) argue that many competitively significant management practices rely on relational
contracts that seem difficult to replicate.
Moving to theory, Kreps (1990b) suggested long ago that different equilibria in a repeated
game might correspond to different corporate cultures (shared understandings of “how we
do things here”) associated with different performance levels across plants and firms. But
modeling performance differences as resulting from different equilibria in a given game implies
that low performers know that better equilibria exist; and yet the model gives these parties
no way to try to reach a better equilibrium and hence offers no rationale for why moving
to a better equilibrium might be difficult. Our model formalizes one such difficulty: low
performers are playing the best equilibrium they can perceive; reaching a better equilibrium
would require changing the parties’ frame.
As one example along these lines, consider the innovations introduced by Toyota in supply-
chain management, which redefine how some key interactions are perceived. The difficulties of
reshaping these shared representations contribute to the difficulties in replicating the results
of the Toyota system even after having imported its contractual framework and manage-
ment tools (Helper and Henderson, 2014). In short, Toyota’s system is geared more towards
explaining when a supplier is expected to cooperate than towards excluding him from fu-
ture interactions (Womack et al., 1990). Ostrom (1990) makes similar observations about
education versus exclusion in communities that successfully manage common-pool resources.
5 Shifts in the frame
The parties’ shared frame could change in many ways; for instance, it could be refined by
increasing the number of cells. In this section we consider shifts in the thresholds, which
change the size of the cells but not their number. The change in the frame may be driven by
an outside shock or a purposeful third agent. For simplicity, we assume that the new frame
is simultaneously shared by both parties.
Consider the simple example where the current threshold pair is (pˆi, pˆ), with pˆ = 1/2 and
the initial threshold pˆi > 1/2 changing to a new threshold pˆi′ < pˆi. We distinguish two cases:
(a) pˆi′ > 1/2, versus (b) pˆi′ < 1/2.
The case pˆi′ > 1/2 is shown in Figure 10. When the parties’ frame changes, they recate-
gorize some games as different situations. Because pˆi′ < pˆi, the probabilities that the agents
perceive S1 and S4 increase, and the probabilities that they perceive S2 and S3 decrease. On
the other hand, because pˆi′+ pˆ > 1, their rational rule of behavior does not change: it remains
the OR rule, and S2 and S4 remain CI games. In short, the parties’ rational behavior changes
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Figure 10: Lowering the threshold from pˆi to pˆi′ > 1/2.
only for the games shaded in Figure 10: the parties recategorize these games from S3 (PD)
to S4 (CI) and thus switch behavior from L to H.
The case pˆi′ < 1/2 is shown in Figure 11. The parties used to play the OR rule but,
pi
p
0
1
S2 S1
S3 S4
pˆipˆi′
1/2
Figure 11: Lowering the threshold from pˆi > 1/2 to pˆi′ < 1/2.
because pˆi′ + pˆ < 1, their rational behavior now switches to the AND rule and they change
strategies (from H to L) in the incongruous situations S2 and S4 shaded in Figure 11. Note
that behavior changes only in games ascribed to the same incongruous situations both before
and after the change in frame; this change in behavior occurs because the change in expected
payoffs for the incongruous situations causes the parties to now perceive these situations as
PD instead of CI.
Even in this simple example we see that a change of the frame may affect not only how
the agents perceive situations (the frame’s footprint) but also how they rationally behave in a
given situation (their rule of behavior). Within the context of this example, we call a change
in frame incremental if the frame’s footprint changes but the rational rule of behavior (OR
or AND) does not, and we call it radical if the rational rule of behavior also changes.
We henceforth assume that frame change is driven by a purposeful third person (called
leader) who seeks to influence the parties (called followers). As an initial model, we assume
that the leader knows everything the modeler knows; in particular, the leader is aware that
the followers perceive the space of games as situations generated by a frame (pˆi, pˆ).
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The novel—and, in our interpretive case, realistic—aspect of our analysis is that the
leader lacks full control of the parties’ new frame: the final outcome of an attempt to change
thresholds is uncertain. This uncertainty may concern: (a) appraisal (e.g., whether and how
much thresholds change), (b) evaluation (e.g., how long it takes before followers revise their
beliefs about payoffs in a reconfigured situation), or (c) behavior (e.g., how long followers
stick with the old rule of behavior after revising their beliefs about payoffs).
Concerning (a) appraisal, the leader takes unmodelled actions that may shift the followers’
threshold pˆi, thus reframing their understanding of the four situations. In our interpretive
case, we imagine the leader taking actions such as using certain language, or extolling certain
behaviors, or telling certain stories—all as efforts to change the followers’ frame. The direction
of this change may be clear, but its magnitude will often be uncertain. Thus we assume that
the leader controls the direction of change (aiming for a higher or a smaller threshold pˆi′),
but not the exact shift. As above, the new frame is simultaneously shared by both followers.
Concerning (b) evaluation, the followers may need time to revise their beliefs about the
payoffs associated with the situations defined by the new frame. We consider only two extreme
cases: either the followers revise payoffs immediately, or with some delay.
Concerning (c) behavior, we make the standard assumption that followers immediately
adjust behavior to a perceived change in payoffs. All this yields two scenarios: (1) the
followers react immediately to a change in frame, revising payoffs at once and changing their
rule of behavior (if needed); or (2) the followers exhibit inertia (because of a delay in revising
beliefs about payoffs) and hence stick to their previous rule of behavior for a while.
Returning to our simple example, the leader may lower or raise the pˆi threshold from its
initial value. We now allow pˆi to be greater or less than 1/2. We code the leader’s two options
as L (Lower the threshold by moving it to the Left) and R (Raise the threshold by moving
it to the Right). The leader is benevolent and maximizes the sum of the payoffs obtained
by the followers in their static interaction under a new frame. Proposition A.7 gives the
expected payoff U to each party. Doubling U , we obtain the leader’s payoff UL represented
in Figure 12.
pˆi
UL
0 1/2 1
1/2
OR
AND
Figure 12: Leader’s payoff as a function of pˆi for pˆ = 1/2.
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Consider scenario (1), where the followers’ appraisal and evaluation are updated immedi-
ately after the frame changes. Suppose that the initial threshold is pˆi > 1/2, so the followers
use the OR rule. What are the leader’s options? Choosing R is dominated by staying put.
Choosing L, on the other hand, is risky: moving to a new threshold pˆi′ < pˆi increases payoffs
only if pˆi′ does not cross over 1/2. In short, under the OR rule, the leader might want to
pursue a strategy of incremental change (i.e., a mild reduction of the threshold), unless the
risk of a radical change—with followers switching to the AND rule—is too high.
Suppose instead that the initial threshold is pˆi < 1/2, so the followers use the AND
rule. Choosing L is a safe option that increases payoffs through incremental change. The
alternative is to choose R and attempt a radical change: if the leader can get the followers’
threshold to cross the 1/2 barrier, this yields a substantial improvement in payoffs, but an
attempt for a radical change carries the risk that the new threshold moves right without
crossing the barrier, making payoffs worse than before.
Now consider scenario (2), where only the followers’ appraisal is updated immediately, but
they then need time to update their evaluation of payoffs and change their rule of behavior.
This adds new trade-offs to the choice between incremental versus radical change.
Under incremental change, the original rule of behavior is still optimal, so there are no
delayed effects on behavior (even if evaluation is slow, as postulated in this scenario). But
suppose that pˆi < 1/2 and the leader attempts a radical change to pˆi′ > 1/2. The followers
are initially using the AND rule, so after a radical change crossing 1/2 from the left the
payoff stays on the lower dashed curve until the followers adjust behavior, and afterwards
jumps up to the higher solid curve—both at the new threshold pˆi′ > 1/2. In short, things get
worse before they get better: inertia in the adaptation of behavior to a radical change in the
frame may cause a transient decline in performance before producing its positive effects—an
“implementation dip” (Fullan, 2001).
Conversely, suppose pˆi > 1/2 and the leader attempts an incremental change to the left
that goes too far, becoming a radical change to pˆi′ < 1/2. Such radical change would enjoy
an initial success before its ultimate failure: transient payoffs would be on the upper dashed
curve, but long-run payoffs would be on the lower solid curve.8
The view that leaders take action to change followers’ mental models is central to the
leadership literature (Argyris, 1982; Schein, 1985; Senge, 1990). Our model is also consistent
with theory and evidence from the organizations literature that radical change is a risky
activity: its development and timing are often opaque (Hannan et al., 2003), leading to a
8 In Figure 12 pˆ is fixed at 1/2 and the OR rule of behavior dominates the AND rule of behavior, but
Figure 6 in Section 3 shows that this is general: therefore, an initial success before ultimate failure may also
occur when radical change is actively sought, not just when it arises mistakenly.
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high rate of failure. And there is broad consensus that radical change is easier in greenfield
sites, where it can be seeded from scratch, than in brownfield sites, where it is inhibited by
pre-existing frames (Brynjolfsson et al., 1997).
Because the leader lacks full control over the followers’ new frame, the leader’s risk attitude
could influence his propensity to attempt incremental versus radical change. In addition, the
leader’s overconfidence (Weinstein, 1980; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) about the transience
of a performance decline or about her ability to minimize this decline may bias her towards
attempting radical change. On the other hand, if pressures for current performance push
an organization towards abandoning radical change prematurely (Repenning and Sterman,
2002), the leader’s overconfidence might beneficially promote persistence in the change effort.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes how coarse cognition can influence strategic interactions. We constructed
a simple framework consistent with both economic and cognitive perspectives, uniting them
through the assumption that the parties share a cognitive frame. The shared frame can be
attributed either to the information the parties receive (the generative approach favored by
economic theory) or to the parties’ perception of the environment (the interpretive viewpoint
preferred by the cognitive sciences).
We provide three main results. The first is that changes in the cognitive frame may induce
a fog of cooperation or a fog of conflict. The second is that, in a repeated interaction, the
frame’s footprint is as important as agents’ patience in achieving full cooperation. And the
third is that incremental or radical changes in frame may have starkly different (short- and
long-run) consequences for performance.
In future work, there may be interesting applications of our generative case to information
design; we intend to explore our interpretive case in various ways. For example, when two
parties hold frames that differ only slightly, they may proceed in harmony for some time before
an unexpected outcome occurs: we are interested in how the parties’ efforts to diagnose such
a misalignment in frames may lead to a repair or a rupture of their relationship. We also plan
to study some of the leader’s actions for changing a frame; we hope such work will contribute
to new perspectives on language and stories in organizations. More generally, we would like
to deepen our understanding of how shared and persistent cognitive representations—typical
of a culture—affect economic interactions.
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A Appendix
Throughout the appendix, we use majuscules to denote random variables and minuscules to denote
their realizations. There are three independent r.v.’s.: A and Z have exponential distributions with
λ = 1, and P has a uniform distribution on (0, 1). It can be shown that the ratio Π = AA+Z has a
uniform distribution on (0, 1). Situations (Π, P ) are uniformly distributed on (0, 1)2.
Proposition A.1. Under the benchmark, the expected payoff from playing a randomly drawn situation
is 1/3.
Proof. Suppose that the parties use their dominant strategies. When Π+P > 1, the (expected) payoff
to an agent is AP ; when Π + P < 1, it is −AP . Write this payoff function as
V = −AP + 2AP1{Π≥1−P} = −AP + 2AP1{Z≤ AP1−P }
Since Z ∼ Exp(1), E
(
1{Z≤ AP1−P }
∣∣A,P) = 1− e− AP1−P . Compute the conditional expectation
E(V |A,P ) = −AP + 2AP1{Z≤ AP1−P } = −AP + 2AP
[
1− e− AP1−P
]
= AP − 2APe− AP1−P
Given that E(Ae−kA) = 1/(1 + k)2, we have E
(
Ae−
AP
1−P
∣∣ P) = (1 − P )2. Using independence, the
expectation of E(V |A,P ) with respect to A ∼ Exp(1) is
E(V |P ) = P − 2P (1− P )2 = −P + 4P 2 − 2P 3
and, finally, computing its expectation with respect to P ∼ U [0, 1] we obtain
E(V ) = −12 +
4
3 −
1
2 =
1
3

As discussed in the main text, a game G(a, z; p) is best-reply equivalent to the game
H L
H pa, pa −(1− p)z, (1− p)z
L (1− p)z,−(1− p)z −pa,−pa
A frame bundles several games as a single situation. We compute the expected payoffs for each
strategy profile over all the games categorised in the same situation. The next two lemmas provide
the building blocks for the computations. For generality, let K = (α, β)× (γ, δ) be the cell including
the games G(A,Z;P ) with Π = A/(A + Z) ∈ (α, β) and P ∈ (γ, δ), where 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ γ < δ ≤ 1; see Figure 13.
Lemma A.2. The expected value of AP over all games G(A,Z;P ) in K is
EK
(
AP
)
= (β
2 − α2)(δ2 − γ2)
2
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Figure 13: A cell in (the cartesian product of) a threshold categorization.
Proof. Let
V = AP1{K} = AP1{α≤Π≤β}1{γ≤P≤δ}
Clearly, α ≤ Π ≤ β if and only if α1−αZ ≤ A ≤ β1−βZ; thus, we have
V = AP1{ α1−αZ≤A≤ β1−βZ}1{γ≤P≤δ}
Using independence,
E(V ) = E
(
A1{ α1−αZ≤A≤ β1−βZ}
)
· E (P1{γ≤P≤δ})
Recall that
∫
ae−a da = −(1 + a)e−a. For k = α1−α < β1−β = m, we have
E
(
A1{kZ≤A≤mZ}
)
=
∫ +∞
0
e−z
(∫ mz
kz
ae−a da
)
dz
=
∫ +∞
0
e−z
[
(1 + kz)e−kz − (1 +mz)e−mz] dz
=
∫ +∞
0
[
(1 + kz)e−(1+k)z − (1 +mz)e−(1+m)z
]
dz
= 11 + k +
k
(1 + k)2 −
1
1 +m −
m
(1 +m)2
= (1− α) + α(1− α)− (1− β)− β(1− β) = β2 − α2,
where the last line follows from replacing k = α1−α and m =
β
1−β . Since
E
(
P1{γ≤U≤δ}
)
= δ
2 − γ2
2 ,
we multiply the two terms and get the result. 
Lemma A.3. The expected value of Z(1− P ) over all games G(A,Z;P ) in K is
EK
[
Z(1− P )
]
= (β − α)(2− β − α)(δ − γ)(2− δ − γ)2
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Proof. Let
V = Z(1− P )1{K} = Z(1− P )1{α≤Π≤β}1{γ≤P≤δ}
Clearly, α ≤ Π ≤ β if and only if 1−ββ A ≤ Z ≤ 1−αα A. Let k = 1−ββ < 1−αα = m. By independence,
E(V ) = E
(
Z1{kA≤Z≤mA}
) · E ((1− P )1{γ≤U≤δ})
Since A and Z are identically distributed, the first term on the right-hand side yields
E
(
Z1{kA≤Z≤mA}
)
= E
(
A1{kZ≤A≤mZ}
)
= 11 + k +
k
(1 + k)2 −
1
1 +m −
m
(1 +m)2
= β + β(1− β)− α− α(1− α) = (β − α)(2− β − α)
where the last line follows from replacing k = 1−ββ and m =
1−α
α . Since
E
(
(1− P )1{γ≤P≤δ}
)
= (δ − γ)(2− δ − γ)2
we multiply the two terms and get the result. 
We prove that each party has a dominant choice for almost every cell K = (α, β) × (γ, δ). We
begin with two lemmata characterizing best replies.
Lemma A.4. Suppose that i’s opponent plays H over the cell K = (α, β)× (γ, δ). Then i’s best reply
over K is H if and only if
β + α
2− (β + α) ≥
2− (δ + γ)
δ + γ (1)
Proof. Under the strategy profile (H,H), by Lemma A.2 the expected payoff for i over K is
EK
(
AP
)
= (β
2 − α2)(δ2 − γ2)
2
Under the strategy profile LH, by Lemma A.3 the expected payoff for i over K is
EK
[
Z(1− P )
]
= (β − α)(2− β − α)(δ − γ)(2− δ − γ)2
Hence, H is preferred to L if and only if
(β2 − α2)(δ2 − γ2)
2 ≥
(β − α)(2− β − α)(δ − γ)(2− δ − γ)
2
Simplifying and rearranging, we obtain the inequality in (1). 
Lemma A.5. Suppose that i’s opponent plays L over the cell K = (α, β)× (γ, δ). Then i’s best reply
over K is H if and only if (1) holds.
22
Proof. Under the strategy profileHL, by Lemma A.2 the expected payoff for i overK is EK
[
−Z(1− P )
]
.
Under the strategy profile LH, by Lemma A.3 the expected payoff for i over K is EK
(
−AP
)
. Hence,
H is preferred to L if and only if EK
(
AP
)
≥ EK
[
−Z(1− P )
]
, which leads again to the inequality
in (1). 
Proposition A.6. Given a cell K = (α, β) × (γ, δ), let pi = (β + α)/2 and p = (δ + γ)/2. Then i
has a (strictly) dominant strategy if pi + p 6= 1 and is indifferent between H and L if equality holds.
Moreover, the dominant strategy is H if pi + p > 1, and it is L if pi + p < 1.
Proof. If we multiply and divide by 2 the expressions on either side of the inequality in (1), we find
pi
1− pi ≥
1− p
p
that, upon rearrangement, is equivalent to pi + p ≥ 1. Then the result follows immediately from
Lemma A.4 and Lemma A.5. 
Proposition A.7. Given the threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ), the expected payoff to each agent under the (unique)
rational rule of behavior is
1
2 − pi
2p2 when pˆi + pˆ > 1
and
1
2 − pi
2 − p2 + pi2p2 when pˆi + pˆ < 1
Proof. Suppose pˆi + pˆ > 1. The dominant rule of behavior is OR, yielding a random payoff AP in
situations S1, S2, S4 and −AP in S3. Lemma A.2 gives the expected payoffs over these four situations.
Taking their sum yields
(1− pi2)(1− p2)
2 +
pi2(1− p2)
2 −
pi2p2
2 +
p2(1− pi2)
2 =
1− 2pi2p2
2
Suppose instead pˆi+ pˆ < 1. The dominant rule of behavior is AND, yielding a random payoff AP
in situation S1, and −AP in situations S2, S3, S4. Proceeding similarly, we find
(1− pi2)(1− p2)
2 −
pi2(1− p2)
2 −
pi2p2
2 −
p2(1− pi2)
2 =
1− 2pi2 − 2p2 + 2pi2p2
2

Proposition A.8. When the OR rule prevails, there is fog of conflict if
pˆi2 · pˆ2 > 1/6 (2)
and fog of cooperation if the opposite (strict) inequality holds.
When the AND rule prevails, there is fog of conflict if
pˆi2 + pˆ2 − pˆi2 · pˆ2 > 1/6 (3)
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and fog of conflict if the opposite (strict) inequality holds.
Proof. By Proposition A.1, the expected payoff to a party under the benchmark is 1/3. Given a
threshold pair (pˆi, pˆ), Proposition A.7 characterizes the expected payoff to a party under the rational
rule of behavior. There is fog of conflict (or cooperation) when this payoff is lower (or greater)
than 1/3. If pˆi + pˆ > 1 and the OR rule applies, the expected payoff is 12 − pi2p2. This is lower (or
greater) than 1/3 when (2) (or its opposite) holds. The argument is similar if pˆi+ pˆ < 1 and the AND
rule applies, taking into account that the expected payoff is 12 − pi2 − p2 + pi2p2. 
Proposition A.9. Suppose that the parties perceive two games (pi1, p1) 6= (pi2, p2) in G as distinct.
Then cooperation on (H,H) for all games (pi, p) can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium
based on a Nash reversion trigger strategy if and only if
δ ≥ 2425 (4)
Proof. Cooperation on (H,H) is a dominant strategy when the one-shot game maps to a pair (pi, p)
such that pi + p ≥ 1. This occurs with probability 1/2. Consider now the complementary event
D− = {(pi, p) : pi + p < 1} and assume that the agents perceive (pi, p) in D−. Cooperation on (H,H)
can be supported only if the long-term benefit from choosing H is never smaller than the short-term
temptation to deviate and pick L. We compare the short-term temptation against the long-term
benefit.
Conditional on the knowledge of (pi, p), the short-term temptation ST is the difference in expected
payoffs from choosing L or H when the other party plays H:
ST = E [(1− p)Z − pA | pi, p]
Using A/(A+ Z) = pi and E(Z) = 1, we obtain that the short-term temptation is
ST = E
[
(1− p)Z − p piZ1− pi | pi
]
= 1− pi − p1− pi
The long-term benefit LB is the discounted sum of the (expected) incremental payoffs from sustaining
cooperation on (H,H) against shifting to (L,L) on D−. Since this occurs with probability 1/2, we
have
LB = 12
(
δ
1− δ
)
E [PA1D− ] =
1
2
(
δ
1− δ
)
E
[
PA1{Π+P<1}
]
and, by the same technique used in the proof of Proposition A.1, we find
LB = 12
(
δ
1− δ
)
E
[
P (1− P )2] = 12
(
δ
1− δ
)
1
12
Cooperation can be supported when the long-term benefit LB is not smaller than the short-term
temptation ST; that is, if
1
24
(
δ
1− δ
)
≥ 1− pi − p1− pi
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or, equivalently, if
δ ≥ 24(1− pi − p)1− pi + 24(1− pi − p)
This follows for any (pi, p) in D− if and only if (4) holds. 
Proposition A.10. Suppose that the parties perceive two games G1 and G2 with (a1, z1; p1) 6=
(a2, z2; p2) as distinct. Then cooperation on (H,H) for all games cannot be a.s. supported by a subgame
perfect equilibrium based on a Nash reversion trigger strategy.
Proof. Given δ, for any game that maps to (pi, p) with pi + p < 1, the long-term benefit from playing
H is δ/[6(1− δ)] while the short-term temptation is (1−p)z−pa: cooperation fails whenever we draw
a game such that (1− p)z − pa > δ/[6(1− δ)]. Since Z has unbounded support and δ < 1, there is a
strictly positive probability that cooperation fails for any combination of a, p, δ. 
Proposition A.11. Suppose x > 1/2. Cooperation on (H,H) in all situations can be supported by a
subgame perfect equilibrium based on a Nash reversion trigger strategy if and only if
δ ≥ 2− 2x2− 2x+ x4 (5)
Proof. Cooperation on (H,H) is a dominant strategy for the one-shot games associated with situations
S1, S2, S4. So we only need to compare the short-term temptation in S3 against the long-term benefit.
The one-shot game perceived by the agents in S3 is depicted on the left of Figure 14. The short-term
H L
H x4/2 −x2(2− x)2/2
L x2(2− x)2/2 −x4/2
S3
H L
H x2(1− x2)/2 −x(2− x)(1− x)2/2
L x(2− x)(1− x)2/2 −x2(1− x2)/2
S2
Figure 14: The one-shot games associated with S3 (left) and S2 (right) for pˆi = pˆ = x.
temptation in S3 is the difference in payoffs from playing L instead of H when the other party plays
H; that is,
x2(2− x)2
2 −
x4
2 = 2x
2(1− x)
The long-term benefit in S3 is the discounted sum of the (expected) incremental payoffs from sustaining
cooperation on (H,H). Since this situation occurs with probability x2, we find
δx2
1− δ
[
x4
2 −
−x4
2
]
= δx
6
1− δ
Cooperation can be supported when the long-term benefit is not smaller than the short-term temp-
tation
δx6
1− δ ≥ 2x
2(1− x)
which yields (5). 
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Proposition A.12. Suppose x < 1/2. Cooperation on (H,H) in all situations can be supported by a
subgame perfect equilibrium based on a Nash reversion trigger strategy if and only if
δ ≥

(1− x)(1− 2x)
1− 3x+ 4x2 − 2x3 − 2x4 + 3x5 for 0 < x ≤
1
4
2− 2x
2− 2x2 − 2x3 + 3x4 for
1
4 < x <
1
2
(6)
Proof. Cooperation on (H,H) is a dominant strategy only for the one-shot game associated with
situation S1, so we need to check the other three situations. By the simplifying assumption pˆi = pˆ = x,
the payoffs for S2 and S4 are identical and we can restrict attention to S3 and S2, depicted in Figure 14.
The short-term temptation is 2x2(1 − x) in S3 and x(1 − x)(1 − 2x) in S2. Comparing the two, the
short-term temptation is greater in S3 for x > 1/4 and in S2 for x < 1/4. Thus, we study the two
cases separately for x ≷ 1/4. The long-term benefit is the same across the three situations S2, S3, S4,
which occur with probability x(1− x), x2, x(1− x) respectively; thus, the long-term benefit is
δ
1− δ
[
2x(1− x)x2(1− x2) + x2 · x4] = δ1− δ [x3 (2− 2x− 2x2 + 3x3)]
When x > 1/4, the greater temptation is in S3 and thus cooperation can be supported if
δ
1− δ
[
x3
(
2− 2x− 2x2 + 3x3)] ≥ 2x2(1− x)
which can be rewritten as
δ ≥ 2− 2x2− 2x2 − 2x3 + 3x4 (7)
When x < 1/4, the greater temptation is in S2 and thus cooperation can be supported if
δ
1− δ
[
x3
(
2− 2x− 2x2 + 3x3)] ≥ x(1− x)(1− 2x)
which yields
δ ≥ (1− x)(1− 2x)1− 3x+ 4x2 − 2x3 − 2x4 + 3x5 (8)
Both right-hand sides for (7) and (8) are decreasing and take value 384/475 ≈ 0.8084 at x = 1/4,
yielding (6). 
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